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CREDITORS' RIGHTS
by
William V. Dorsaneo, HP1*

T

HE debtor-creditor relationship encompasses a wide range of legal
subjects. This Article constitutes an endeavor to present current developments in topics of general concern to attorneys who must struggle with
problems of debtors and creditors. Coverage has beeen limited to subjects
customarily discussed in courses entitled "Creditors' Rights," excluding
bankruptcy matters.
The text of the Article has been classified under the headings of unreasonable collection efforts, fraudulent conveyances, extraordinary remedies and
execution, sworn accounts, usury, and receivership. For developments in
other related areas the Survey article entitled "Commercial Transactions"
should be consulted.
I.

UNREASONABLE COLLECTION EFFORTS

Several cases decided during the survey period have construed the recently
2
enacted Texas Debt Collection Practices Act.' The Act provides a consumer
3
4
5
statutory remedies when a debt collector utilizes a prohibited practice or act
in connection with the collection or attempted collection of any debt.6 In
Ledisco FinancialServices, Inc. v. Viracola7 the Act was construed in the
context of an attempted retrieval of a cancelled credit card from a consumer
by means of alleged violence and obscene telephone calls. 8 Initially, the
defandants argued that the Act's provisions were inapplicable to credit card
retrieval because the defendant collection agency made no attempt to collect
any money from the plaintiff. In rejecting this argument the court reasoned
that the statutory remedies are available when an act or practice specifically
* B.A., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., University of Texas. Assistant Professor of
Law, Southern Methodist University.
I. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-11.01 to .11 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
2. "Consumer" is defined as "an individual who owes or allegedly owes a debt created
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." Id. art. 5069-11.01(d).
3. Any person may seek injunctive relief to prevent or restrain a violation of this
Act and any person may maintain an action for actual damages sustained as a
result of a violation of this Act. A person who successfully maintains such action
shall be awarded attorneys' fees reasonable in relation to the amount of work
expended and costs.
Id. art. 5069-11.10.
4. "Debt collectors" are persons "engaging directly or indirectly in debt collection." Id.
art 5069-11.01(c).
5. The Act contains 31 specific prohibited practices or acts. See id. arts. 5069-11.02 to .06.
6. "Debt" is defined as "any obligation or alleged obligation arising out of a consumer
transaction." Id. art. 5069-11.01(a).
7. 533 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
8. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-11.02(a), -11.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77) which,
inter alia, prohibit using or threatening to use violence or other criminal means to cause harm to
the person or property of any person and using profane or obscene language or language that is
intended to abuse the hearer or reader unreasonably.
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proscribed by the Act is employed in connection with the collection of or
attempt to collect any debt. 9 Since the term "debt" is defined by the Act as
"any obligation or alleged obligation arising out of a consumer transaction,"'' 0
the court held that because the debtor was obligated to return the credit card
upon its cancellation, it did not matter that the defendant collection agency
was not employed by the credit card issuer to collect a monetary obligation.
The most significant aspect of the Viracola case deals with the availability
of a damage remedy to the plaintiff who has suffered mental anguish,
unaccompanied by physical injury, injury to property, or other pecuniary
damage of that kind. Construing the Act as creating a new statutory tort, the
court held that damages for mental anguish alone can be recovered even if the2
plaintiff has sustained no other damage." Consequently, prior case law'
which requires allegation and proof of a physical injury, injury to property, or
other pecuniary loss before a cause of action based upon the common law tort
of unreasonable collection efforts accrues, does not preclude recovery for
mental anguish alone when the cause of action is based upon the use of a
collection device disallowed by the Act.
In CentralAdjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Gonzales 31 the court considered the
"bona fide error"' 14 defense asserted by the defendant. Not surprisingly, the
defendant-appellant's contention that the defense does not require a showing
that the debt collector adopted reasonable procedures to avoid the error was
rejected. Consequently, reasonable procedures to avoid errors must be
adopted by the debt collector before the affirmative defense of bona fide
error will be available. In Gonzales the court of civil appeals also considered a
request for appellate attorneys' fees made by the plaintiff-appellee's counsel
for the first time in a cross-point. In rejecting the request the court held that
although a recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees for appellate work, if such
should be necessary, may be included in a judgment entered by a trial court,15
the request comes too late when made for the first time in the court of civil
appeals. Consequently, the plaintiff should plead, prove, and secure a
judgment for reasonable attorneys' fees for both trial and appellate work in
the trial court.
The subject of attorneys' fees was also considered in Rusk County Electric
Corp. v. Flanagan.6 The plaintiffs instituted suit to recover damages resulting from the termination of electricity after the nonpayment of a $2.02 bill.
Judgment was entered in accordance with the verdict of the jury, awarding
the plaintiffs $250 for actual damages and $1,500 for attorney's fees. The
9. 533 S.W.2d at 955.
10. See note 6 supra.
11. 533 S.W.2d at 957. See also Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973); Fisher v.
Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967).
12. See, e.g., Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954). See also
Anderson, Coercive Collection and Exempt Property in Texas: A Debtor's Paradise or a Living
Hell?, 13 Hous. L. REV. 84 (1975).
13. 528 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ).
14. "No person shall be guilty of a violation of this Act if the action complained of resulted
from a bona fide error, notwithstanding the use of reasonable procedures adopted to avoid such
error." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN art. 5069-11.08 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
15. See International Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Spray, 468 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1971).
16. 538 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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actual damages were sustained as a result of food spoilage in the plaintiffs'
freezer and the loss of use of their home, 7 but not, according to the appellate
court's reasoning, as a result of the defendant's attempt to collect a debt by
"unfair means."" Concluding that attorney's fees are recoverable under the
Act only in an action "for actual damages sustained as a result of a violation of
this Act,"' 9 the court of civil appeals reversed the portion of the judgment
awarding attorney's fees for the reason that the damages sustained by the
plaintiffs resulted from the wrongful termination of electricity and were not a
result of any unreasonable collection efforts. In other words, according to the
court's construction of the statute, it is not a violation of the Act to disconnect
a consumer's electricity in order to coerce the consumer to pay an obligation
which is not due. E" The court's apparent conclusion that the defendant was
not attempting to collect extra and unusual charges when it terminated the
transmission of electric power to the plaintiffs' home is difficult to accept.
One unreasonable collection case decided during the survey period does
not involve an interpretation of the Texas Debt Collection Practices Act. In
Pullins v. Credit Exchange of Dallas, Inc.2 the defendant's employee made
several demands for payment of a hospital bill after it had been paid. The
demands were accompanied by statements that immediate suit would be filed
and that the alleged debtor would be unable to go to any hospital unless
payment was made. The jury found that the debt collector made no unreasonable collection efforts. The trial court rendered judgment on the verdict. The
court of civil appeals held that the jury finding was against the great weight
and preponderance of the evidence and stated that "all defendant's collection
efforts after the date of payment. . .[were] unreasonable. "22 The statement
should not be taken too literally. Although post-payment collection efforts
are more likely to be actionable, a polite request for payment after payment
has been made should not result in liability to the debt collector. Moreover,
17.

Id. at 500.

18. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.04 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77) states that "[n]o
debt collector may collect or attempt to collect any debt by unfair or unconscionable means
.
...
The jury found that the defendant attempted to collect extra and unusual charges before
reconnecting the electricity at plaintiff's home. 538 S.W.2d at 500.
19. See note 3 supra.
20.

This construction of the statute is, however, an accurate one. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.

arts. 5069-11.01 to. 11 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77) limit the prohibited acts to those specifically set
forth in the statute. For example, art. 5069-11.02 states that "[n]o debt collector may collect or
attempt to collect any debt alleged to be due and owing by any threats, coercion, or attempts to
coerce which employ any of the following practices." The termination of electrical services is not
included in the list of prohibited practices. Arts. 5069-11.03, "Harassment; Abuse," and
5069-11.04, "Unfair or Unconscionable Means," are similarly limited to specific practices which
do not include the termination of electrical services. Consequently, it appears that the debt
collector can utilize coercive tactics which he has no legal right to employ without committing a
violation of the Act so long as the specific practice employed is not proscribed. In this
connection, Professor Anderson has suggested that since the Act omits any specific reference to
contacts by the creditor of the debtor's employer, the Act does not provide sufficient protection
to consumers where they really need it. See Anderson, supra note 12, at 124. But see TEX.REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.02(c) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77). Although the Texas harassment tort
is undoubtedly still available, no attorneys' fees can be recovered, except under the heading of
punitive damages, unless the collection practice is also proscribed by the Act.
21.

538 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).

22. Id.

216
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although several cases 23 apparently predicate recovery on the theory of

negligence, the better reasoned cases require the defendant to inflict the
injury suffered intentionally.24 In this connection the Pullins case also reiterates prior holdings that a suit for damages for unreasonable collection efforts
is not a suit for negligence and that contributory negligence, therefore, is not a
defense .25
The court of civil appeals also concluded that the record contained evi-

dence that the collection efforts "upset" Mr. Pullins, who was sick with
cancer and who died prior to trial, and that Mrs. Pullins was "upset, [and]
took crying spells." 26 Although the nonstatutory unreasonable collection
efforts tort requires that a physical injury or some other pecuniary damage be
suffered in addition to mental anguish before a cause of action will accrue,27
Pullins suggests that the requirement is very easily satisfied.
II.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES

Three cases decided during the survey period dealt with the subject of
fraudulent conveyances. Although Texas has not adopted the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyances Act, 28 chapter 24 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, based upon the Statute of Elizabeth,29 does provide a remedy to
creditors when their debtors transfer 30 property to third persons under certain
circumstances.
If a transfer of real or personal property is made by a debtor who intends to

delay, or hinder, or defraud "any creditor, purchaser, or other interested
person from obtaining that to which he is, or may become entitled, '31 the
33
transfer is void 32 as to any "creditor, purchaser or other interested person."
The avoidance of the transfer, however, will be precluded if the real or
personal property is transferred to a purchaser for value unless he purchases
23. Moore v. Savage, 359 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam,
362 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1962); Industrial Fin. Serv. Co. v. Riley, 295 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1956), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 157 Tex. 306, 302 S.W.2d 652 (1957).
24. See Anderson, supra note 12, at 115-16.
25. 538 S.W.2d at 683.
26. Id.
27. Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954).
28. 9B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 70 (1966).
29. 13 Eliz., c. 5 (1570).
30. See TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 24.01 (Vernon 1968). "In this chapter, unless the
context requires a different definition, 'transfer' includes conveyance, gift, assignment and
charge." Id.
31. Id. § 24.02(a).
32. Actually the transfer is "voidable." Only persons hindered, delayed or defrauded can
attack it. For example, a fraudulent conveyance is valid as between the transferor and the
transferee if it is otherwise valid under contract law.
33. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 24.02(a) (Vernon 1968) provides:
A transfer of real or personal property, a suit, a decree, judgment or execution, or
a bond or other writing is void with respect to a creditor, purchaser, or other
interested person if the transfer, suit, decree, judgment, execution, or bond or
other writing was intended to
(1) delay or hinder any creditor, purchaser, or other interested person from
obtaining that to which he is, or may become, entitled; or
(2) defraud any creditor, purchaser, or other interested person of that to which
he is, or may become, entitled.

1977]

CREDITORS' RIGHTS

with notice of the intent of his transferor to hinder, delay, or defraud. 34 Since
the remedy is unavailable unless the transferee has notice of the transferor's
intent or the fraud that voided the title of his transferor, the interpretation of
the purchaser for value requirement is of extreme importance to creditors. 35
First Southern Properties, Inc. v. Gregory36 provides an analysis of the
purchaser for value requirement. The transferor owned an individual one-half
interest in a tract of land as his separate property and divorce proceedings
were pending between the transferor and his spouse. During the course of the
divorce proceedings a pendente lite order enjoining the transferor from
selling any of his separate or community property had been entered. Subsequent to the entry of the injunctive order the transferor deeded his undivided
one-half interest in the tract to his brother. The deed was retained by the
transferor and was not recorded until over a year later. The transferor never
disclosed the fact that he had made a conveyance of the property to his
attorneys, his spouse, or the divorce court. Thereafter, the transferor's
spouse was granted a divorce in the pending divorce proceedings. The divorce
judgment awarded the undivided one-half interest in the land to the transferor
and a monetary recovery to the transferor's spouse in the sum of $2,500,
secured by a lien on the transferor's interest in the land. After the entry of the
divorce judgment a constable levied execution on the transferor's interest in
the land. An execution sale was held at which First Southern Properties, Inc.
purchased the realty. Subsequently, the transferor's brother, the transferee,
brought an action in trespass to try title against First Southern Properties, Inc.
and its president, who specially answered that the real property had been
acquired by First Southern Properties, Inc. under an execution sale and that
the prior purported conveyance from the transferor to his brother had been
executed without consideration and as the result of a fraudulent conspiracy
between the two brothers. The trial court determined that the transferor
conveyed the subject property without intent to defraud, that the conveyance
was made for a valuable consideration, and that the transferee brother did not
know of or participate in any attempt to defraud the transferor's spouse or
possible creditors of the transferor.37 On appeal the court of civil appeals first
considered whether the transferor spouse intended to defraud his former
wife. 38 Holding that the trial court's finding that the transferor had no actual
fraudulent intent was against the great weight and preponderance of the
credible evidence, the court of civil appeals utilized a traditional "badges of
34. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 24.02(b) (Vernon 1968) states: "The title of a purchaser
for value is not void under Subsection (a) of this section unless he purchased with notice of (1)the
intent of his transferor to delay, hinder, or defraud; or (2) the fraud that voided the title of his
transferor."
35. It must be noted that in at least one situation a transferee must also be shown to have not
acted in "good faith." In Hawes v. Central Texas Prod. Credit Ass'n, 503 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.
1973), the supreme court concluded that a creditor seeking to avoid a preference under § 24.02
should present evidence of a lack of the transferee's good faith because it is a constituent element
of the creditor's cause of action. It is not enough that the transferee has notice of the intent of an
insolvent transferor to hinder, delay, and defraud other creditors while preferring the transferee.
Id. at 236.
36. 538 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ).
37. Id. at 455.
38. Id. at 457. See also TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 24.02(a) (Vernon 1968).
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fraud" analysis. 39 The transferor's failure to record the transfer for more than
a year, his retention of possession of the deed, his collection of rental from the
property, his claim of ownership in proceedings which the transferor initiated
to enjoin the constable's execution sale, and the fact that the transfer was an
intrafamily transaction 40 convinced the appellate court that the finding of the
trial court that the transferor did not intend to defraud anyone was against the
great weight and preponderance of the evidence. 4 The court of civil appeals

then reviewed the finding of the trial court that the transferee brother was a
purchaser for value without knowledge or notice of the fraudulent intent of
the transferor. The appellate court determined that the trial court's finding
that the statutory value requirement had been satisfied was supported by
sufficient evidence.42

In First Southern Properties, Inc. the trial court also determined that the
transferee brother did not have knowledge or notice of the fraudulent intent
of the transferor. This finding was also upheld in the court of civil appeals as
being supported by sufficient evidence. The transferee did not have notice of
the divorce proceedings 43 and, therefore, did not have constructive notice of

the transferor's intent to hinder, delay, or defraud. The deposition testimony
of the transferee reflected that he was not aware of his brother's involvement
in the divorce proceedings, that he was not sure when he first learned about
the divorce, that he did not know why the deed had not been recorded until
1971, that he had taken up payments on a first lien note and had paid interest
on his own note annually, and that he had bought the property for investment
purposes and to help his brother financially. Since there was no direct
evidence that the transferee-brother knew of the fraudulent intent of the
transferor, the court of civil appeals concluded that the transferee-brother
was a bona fide' purchaser for value without notice.
39. See Bryant v. Kelton & Uzzell, I Tex. 415,420 (1841); Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809
(K.B. 1601).
40. See Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 53 (Tex. 1964).
41. 538 S.W.2d at 457.
42. The value consisted of a $2,000 cash payment and the delivery of a promissory note in the
principal amount of $9,436.57. The nature of the value necessary to protect a purchaser in the
context of fraudulent conveyance law is not equivalent to the concept of valuable consideration
under the law of contracts. For example, the value requirement can be satisfied by the
cancellation of an antecedent debt or obligation. Quinn v. Dupree, 157 Tex. 441, 303 S.W.2d 769
(1957); Adams v. Williams, 112 Tex. 469, 248 S.W. 673 (1923). However, when the debtor is
insolvent, it is clear that the antecedent obligation cancelled must be of fair equivalent value to
the property transferred in order to avoid being a fraudulent conveyance. O'Banion v. Henry, 128
Tex. 59,96 S.W.2d 233 (1936); Halff v. Goldfrank, 49 S.W. 1095 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, writ ref'd).
See also Hawes v. Central Tex. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 503 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. 1973).
43. No lis pendens was filed. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6640 (Vernon 1969);
McKnight, MatrimonialProperty, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 129, 138 (1968), on
the effect of TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.57 (Vernon 1975).
44. See, e.g., Hawes v. Central Texas Prod. Credit Ass'n, 503 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. 1973),
discussed at note 35 supra. Nonetheless, since the case did not involve a preference it is clear that
the court did not use the words "good faith" to mean something other than a lack of notice of the
transferor's intent. The determination of the existence of the transferee's knowledge or notice of
the transferor's intent, like the issue of the transferor's intent, should be made ordinarily by
considering the "badges of fraud" that attend the transaction. The lack of recordation of the
deed, the intrafamily character of the transfer, the retention of the deed by the transferor, and his
collection of rents after the purported transfer come very close to being evidence of notice as a
matter of law.
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Section 24.0345 also received interpretation in the context of an intrafamily
transfer in Pope Photo Records, Inc. v. Malone.46 The plaintiff instituted the
action to recover the balance of a debt previously incurred by the defendant's
husband from the lump sum proceeds of his life insurance received by the
defendant, his surviving widow, after the husband's death. The creditor
contended that the decedent-debtor did not have sufficient assets subject to
execution at the time of his death in November 1973 to pay all of his existing
debts, that it was an existing creditor on the date of death, that under Texas
marital property law a gift of the policy rights to such beneficiary is presumed
to have been intended and completed by the death of the insured, 47 and that
since the beneficiary survived the decedent-debtor, a fraudulent transfer
occurred on the date of his death. In rejecting this argument the court of civil
appeals concluded that the date of the transfer is the date the beneficiary is
designated, not the date when the gift is completed by the death of the insured
owner of the policy. 48 Since no evidence was presented that the decedent was
insolvent on the date he designated his spouse as beneficiary, the transfer was
held not to be fraudulent. 49 This result makes sense when the right to change
the beneficiary has not been retained by the debtor policy owner. It is clear,
however, that the court's conclusion is not so limited.
The third case which treats the subject of fradulent conveyance law is
Nobles v. Marcus.5" Judgment creditors of a corporation brought suit to set
aside a deed and to affix a judgment lien on a tract of realty which had been
deeded to third parties in 1971. The judgment creditors obtained a default
judgment against the corporation in November 1972.51 The first theory upon
which the conveyance evidenced by the deed was attacked was that the
person who signed the deed purporting to act in behalf of the corporation was
not authorized by the corporation to act in a representative capacity and that
the deed was void as a forgery. The supreme court held that the deed was not
forged because the purported agent had signed his true name. The fact that he
had no authority and was not an agent of the corporation did not make his
signature a forgery; 2 hence the deed was not void.
The plaintiffs also asserted that the person who purported to act for the
45.

TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 24.03 (Vernon 1968) provides:

(a) A transfer by a debtor is void with respect to an existing creditor of the debtor
if the transfer is not made for fair consideration, unless, in addition to the
property transferred, the debtor has at the time of transfer enough property in this
state subject to execution to pay all of his existing debts.
(b) Subsection (a) of this section does not void a transfer with respect to a
subsequent creditor of a purchaser from the debtor.
46. 539 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ).
47. Id. at 226; see Brown v. Lee, 371 S.W.2d 694, 699 (Tex. 1963).
48. 539 S.W.2d at 226; see Parker Square State Bank v. Huttash, 484 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
49. It appears that the policy (cash surrender value) was exemptfrom judicial process on the
date the wife was designated beneficiary. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3836(a)(6) (Vernon
Supp. 1976-77). Therefore, even if the husband was insolvent when he designated his wife
beneficiary, the transfer would not be fraudulent if the policy was in effect for two years.
50. 533 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. 1976).
51. The opinion unfortunately does not reflect when the judgment creditors became
creditors of the corporate defendant.
52. 533 S.W.2d at 926.
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corporation acted "without authority and/or. . .[that] the conveyance was
made without any valuable consideration. . . . ,,53
In this connection the
supreme court first stated that the plaintiffs pleaded both of these acts as
frauds upon the corporation and not as a fraud upon their own rights as
creditors. In a curious sentence, however, the court stated that "the plaintiffs
lack standing to bring the present action, not because they incompletely

pleaded the elements of a fraudulent conveyance but because they pleaded
54
fraud, and under those pleadings they were not the defrauded party."
Apparently, the court's reasoning was that a creditor of a defrauded corporation had no standing to institute the fraud action in its behalf and that the
plaintiffs had not pleaded a fraudulent conveyance cause of action at all.
Since pleading defects of form or substance may be waived if no special
exception is leveled at the defective pleading, it seems likely that the court is
suggesting that if the plaintiffs had pleaded a cause of action based on the
fraudulent conveyance statutes, they would be entitled to prove it if they

could. The opinion should not be construed to mean that if the transferor is
defrauded in connection with the transfer, the transfer cannot also be
fraudulent with respect to the transferor's existing creditors if all other
elements of a fraudulent transfer as denied by statute exist.
III.

EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES AND EXECUTION

A. Garnishment
Not surprisingly, the constitutional validity of postjudgment garnishment
was upheld during the survey period in Ranchers & Farmers Livestock
Auction Co. v. FirstState Bank.5 5 The debtor, who intervened in a postjudg-

ment garnishment proceeding, asserted that the procedure involved an unconstitutional taking of property without due process of law.56 Relying upon a
dictum contained in Southwest Warehouse Corp. v. Wee Tote, Inc. :7 which
declared article 408458 unconstitutional in the prejudgment garnishment con53. Id.
54. Id. at 927.
55. 531 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ).
56. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Co., 395 U.S. 337
(1969).
57. 504 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ). "Sniadach and
Fuentes are clearly inapplicable to post-judgment garnishment." Id. at 594.
58. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4084 (Vernon 1966):
From and after the service of such writ of garnishment, it shall not be lawful for
the garnishee to pay to the defendant any debt or to deliver to him any effects; nor
shall the garnishee, if an incorporated or joint stock company in which the
defendant is alleged to be the owner of shares or to have an interest, permit or
recognize any sale or transfer of such shares or interest; and any such payment or
delivery, sale or transfer shall be void and of no effect as to so much of said debt,
effect, shares, or interest as may be necessary to satisfy the plaintiff's demand.
The defendant may, at any time before judgment, replevy any effects, debts,
shares, or claims of any kind seized or garnished, by giving bond, with two or
more good and sufficient sureties to be approved by the officer who issued the
writ of garnishment, payable to the plaintiff, in double the amount of the
plaintiff's debt, and conditioned for the payment of any judgment that may be
rendered against the said garnishee in such suit, which when properly approved
shall be filed among the papers in the cause in the court in which the suit is
pending. In all proceedings in garnishment where the defendant gives bond as
herein provided for, such defendant may make any defense which the defendant
in garnishment could make in such suit.
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text because it required the debtor's property to be frozen in the hands of the
garnishee without notice and hearing before judgment, the court of civil
appeals clearly decided that articles 4076(3) 59 and 40846 pass constitutional
muster in the postjudgment garnishment context. This result is in accordance
with the United States Supreme Court opinion in Sniadach v. FamilyFinance
Corp.,61 which held the Wisconsin wage garnishment statute unconstitutional because it permitted the prehearing seizure of the debtor's property before
the "validity or probable validity" of the debt could be established. 62 Once
the judgment against the debtor in the primary suit has been entered, the
validity or probable validity of the debt has been established and the defendant has been afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Several other postjudgment garnishment cases were decided during the
64
63
survey period. In Addison v. Addison it was held that a state institution
was exempt from garnishment proceedings and that the judgment debtor had
a direct interest in the garnishment proceedings instituted against the state
of the writ by motion to quash.
agency and was entitled to attack the issuance 65
The basis for the exemption is public policy.
In Go International,Inc. v. Big-Tex Crude Oil Co. 66 the issue was whether a
garnishing creditor could reach the unpaid proceeds of the purchase of
production from oil and gas leases in the hands of a garnishee-oil company
when the debtor-oil operator had no interest in any of the production at the
time the writ of garnishment was served or when the garnishee has answered.
The court of civil appeals held that although the debtor was to be paid one
hundred percent of the proceeds by the garnishee, the fact that the debtor
owned no interest in the production but merely acted as a disbursing agent for
the purpose of distributing payment to the actual owners of the production
supported the trial court's conclusion that the garnishee was not indebted to
the judgment debtor.
Dean v. K-C Fuel Co. 67 involved an extremely interesting procedural
tangle. In July 1974 a default judgment was obtained against an alleged debtor
who, thereafter, timely sued out' a writ of error. The court of civil appeals
reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause to the trial
59. Id. art. 4076(3):
The clerks of the district and county courts and justices of the peace may issue
writs of garnishment, returnable to their respective courts in the following cases:
3. Where the plaintiff has a valid, subsisting judgment and makes affidavit that
the defendant has not, within his knowledge, property in his possession within
this State, subject to execution, sufficient to satisfy such judgment.
60. Id. art. 4084.
61. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
62. Id. at 343 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,
419 U.S. 601 (1975), noted in 29 Sw. L.J. 660 (1975).
63. 530 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ).
64. Texas Southern University and its Board of Regents.
65. See also Delta County Levee Improvement Dist. No. 2 v. Leonard, 516 S.W.2d 911,912
(Tex. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 829 (1976); National Sur. Corp. v. Friendswood Ind. School
Dist., 433 S.W.2d 690, 694 (Tex. 1968); Willacy County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No.
I v. Abendroth, 142 Tex. 320, 321, 177 S.W.2d 936, 937 (1944).
66. 531 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, no writ).
67. 524 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ), rev'd following remand, 537
S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
68. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2255 (Vernon 1971).
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court for further proceedings.69 The judgment creditor, however, had previously filed an application for a writ of garnishment against a bank where the
judgment debtor's funds or effects were on deposit, and a judgment was
entered in the garnishment proceeding against the garnishee-bank. This latter
judgment became final and was never appealed or otherwise attacked until
the debtor filed his "Motion to Recover Sums Paid Under Garnishment
Pursuant to Judgment Afterwards Reversed" in the trial court to which the
original or primary suit was remanded. The trial court granted the motion and
ordered the garnishor to return to the debtor what it received by virtue of the
judgment in the garnishment proceedings. The court of civil appeals reversed.
The basis for the reversal was that the judgment against the bank in the
garnishment proceedings was a final judgment7" and the trial court was
without authority to set it aside except by bill of review. 7 The court also held
that the debtor's motion did not qualify as a bill of review 72 because he failed
to prove that his failure to present a meritorious defense was unmixed with
any fault or negligence of his own.
The result seems to lose sight of the function and character of the postjudgment garnishment proceedings. Despite the fact that a garnishment proceeding is docketed as a separate suit,73 it is clear that a judgment in the
garnishment proceeding cannot be rendered until judgment has been rendered
against the defendant in the primary suit.7 4 Moreover, article 407675 requires
that the plaintiff have a "valid, subsisting judgment" before a postjudgment
writ of garnishment may be issued. While the garnishment statutes and rules
do not contemplate what should happen if the judgment in the primary suit is
reversed after the judgment in the garnishment proceeding is entered, it is
abundantly clear that the garnishment proceeding is ancillary to and dependent upon the primary suit. Moreover, postjudgment garnishment is in the
nature of execution. While there is no question that a supersedeas bond is
required to forestall levy of a writ of execution, 76 the defendant in execution
may, of course, recover the full value of the property levied upon or
surrendered if the judgment is later reversed on appeal. There is no requirement that the defendant in execution show a lack of negligence. 77
In Bank of Dallas v. Republic National Bank 78 the court of civil appeals
considered the issues of whether the income and/or corpus of an irrevocable
69. 524 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ).
70. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b. A trial court judgment is final thirty days after it is entered if no
timely motion for new trial is filed.
71. Id.
72. 537 S.W.2d at 493; see Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 226 S.W.2d 996 (1950);
Deen v. Deen, 530 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App.-Forth Worth 1975, no writ).
73. See Cleveland v. San Antonio Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 148 Tex. 211,223 S.W.2d 226(1949).
74. TEX. R. Civ. P. 667.
75.
76.

77.

TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4076(3) (Vernon 1966).
TEX. R. Civ. P. 364, 365.

See Cleveland v. Tufts, 69 Tex. 580, 584, 7 S.W. 72, 75 (1888):
The judgment does not protect the plaintiff in converting the defendant's property to his own use. He must account to the full extent of the injury he has inflicted,

not for the amount merely that he or his agents have reaped as the fruits of the
illegal act, or the sum at which this act has caused the property to be sacrificed.
See also Texas Trunk R.R. v. Jackson, 85 Tex. 605, 22 S.W. 1030 (1893); Brinegar v. Henderson
Hardware Co., 95 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1936, no writ).
78. 540 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
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spendthrift trust created by the settlor for the benefit of herself and her
children could be reached by a postjudgment writ of garnishment. In holding
that the interest of the settlor could be reached by the settlor's creditors, the
court stated the familiar rule that although Texas recognizes the validity of
spendthrift trusts,7 9 when the settlor creates a trust for his own benefit and

inserts a spendthrift clause, the clause is void as far as existing or future
creditors are concerned. They can reach the settlor's interest by garnishment.
Since the settlor in the instant case was to receive all the income of the trust
during her lifetime for her "uncontrolled use and benefit,' '80 the income of the
trust was subject to garnishment. Moreover, since the trust also gave the
for the benefit of the settlor, the entire
trustee discretion to invade the corpus
81
corpus was subject to garnishment.
FirstBank & Trust v. Goss82 also involved a judgment creditor's attempt to
garnish a spendthrift trust. This time, however, the judgment debtor was the
beneficiary of the spendthrift trust created by another. Citing State of
CaliforniaDepartment of Mental Hygiene v. Bank of the Southwest National
Association,83 the court of civil appeals held that neither the principal nor the
accumulated but unpaid income of the trust was subject to garnishment. The
garnishor argued that because the income had been accumulated in a bank
account, the beneficiary had unilaterally altered the terms of the trust and
made himself the settlor of the accumulated income under his own revocable
trust. 84 The court rejected this novel idea 85 as having no merit.
King v. Floyd 6 construed article XVI, section 28 of the Texas Constitution 87 and article 409988 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes in the context of a
postjudgment garnishment action. The central issue in the case involved the
interpretation of the requirement that the unpaid wages constitute current
wages. The debtor had been employed by a professional football team as a
player. In August 1968 he suffered an injury and was placed on the team's
79. No part of a spendthrift trust estate can be taken on execution or garnishment by
creditors of the beneficiary. Highland State Bank v. Gonzales, 340 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1960, no writ).
80. 540 S.W.2d at 501.
81. Relying upon RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156, Comment e (1959), the court
stated:
Where by the terms of the trust a trustee is to pay the settlor or apply for his
benefit as much of the income or principal as the trustee may in his discretion

determine. . . creditors can reach the maximum amount which the trustee could
pay to him or apply for his benefit.
540 S.W.2d at 502.
82. 533 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1976, no writ).
83. 163 Tex. 314,354 S.W.2d 576 (1962). See also Huestis v. Manley, 110 Vt. 413,8 A.2d 644
(1939).

84. The facts revealed that the trustee had been unable to locate the beneficiary for a number
of years. Consequently the accumulated income had been deposited in a savings account in the
trustee's name.
85. The settlor had foreseen the possibility that the income might not be distributed each
year and made provision in the trust for its deposit at a bank in a savings account.
86. 538 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.) 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
87. "No current wages for personal service shall be subject to garnishment." TEX. CONST.
art. XVI, § 28.
88. "No current wages for personal service shall be subject to garnishment; and where it
appears upon the trial that the garnishee is indebted to the defendant for such current wages, the
garnishee shall nevertheless be discharged as to such indebtedness." TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN.

art. 4099 (Vernon 1966). See also the reference to current wages in art. 3833 as discussed in
McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 86 (1974).
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inactive player list. Shortly after he was returned to the active player list his
contract was terminated. Alleging a breach of his employment contract, the
debtor sued the team and recovered a judgment which was appealed. Appellate proceedings did not end until the Supreme Court of Texas refused an
application for a writ of error in 1975. Six days later the application for the
writ of garnishment was filed against the team as garnishee by the ex-player's
judgment creditor. The garnishee answered that it was indebted and tendered
the amount of indebtedness into the registry of the court, interpleading the
judgment debtor who asserted that the debt was exempt from garnishment.
Since the debtor had not voluntarily left the amount owed in the hands of the
team and never was in control of the fund, the court held that the funds, if
wages, constituted current wages.8 9 The court also rejected the garnishor's

contention that the judgment debtor was an independent contractor 9° and the
contention that the judgment was for money damages and not wages. 91

B. Execution
In Collum
the court of civil appeals set aside a sale under
execution. Pantaze v. Slocum 93 was cited for the general principle that an
execution sale will not be set aside upon proof that it was made for a grossly
inadequate price; the sale must also be accompanied by irregularities which
tend to contribute to the inadequacy of the price. The price paid for the realty
sold at the execution sale in the instant case was less than fifteen percent of its
value.' Moreover, the levying officer failed to make any attempt to give the
judgment debtor an opportunity to designate property, as required by rule
637. 95 These two factors constituted a sufficient basis for setting the execution sale aside.
The appellate court also held that inadequacy of price, standing alone, is
sufficient to justify the setting aside of the sale when the judgment debtor
promptly offers to make the purchaser at the execution sale whole by
returning his investment in the property and paying all costs. 96 Since the
judgment debtor had made a proper tender, the judgment of the trial court
awarding the judgment creditor who purchased the property at the execution
sale the amount tendered together with attorney's fees and his costs was
affirmed.
The duty of a levying officer to exercise due diligence in levying a writ of
execution was considered in Mooney v. Producers GrainCorp. I With regard
to an officer who fails or refuses to levy upon or sell any property subject to
v. DeLoughter92

89. See Bell v. Indian Live-Stock Co., 11 S.W. 344 (Tex. 1889); Smith v. Bradshaw, 105
S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1937, no writ); J.M. Radford Grocery Co. v. McKean, 41
S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1931, no writ).
90. The term "wages for personal service" necessarily implies a relationship of master and
servant, or employer and employee, and excludes compensation due to an independent contractor. See Brasher v. Carnation Co., 92 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1936, no writ).
91. 538 S.W.2d at 169.
92. 535 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
93. 518 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, no writ).
94. 535 S.W.2d at 393.
95. TEX. R. Civ. P. 637.
96. See Prudential Corp. v. Bazaman, 512 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974,
no writ); Moore v. Miller, 155 S.W. 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1913, writ ref'd).
97. 531 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ).
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execution, article 38259' provides that "when the same might have been done,
he and his sureties shall be liable to the party entitled to receive the money
collected on such execution for the full amount of the debt, interest and costs
. . . ." Although the liability is not absolute if the officer pleads and proves
that he had a reasonable excuse for failure to levy, 99 his failure in this case to
plead excuse affirmatively precluded the officer from introducing evidence in
explanation of his failure to levy.
C. Homestead
The issue of whether a purchase money mortgage should be satisfied out of
the excess or nonexempt portion of an urban homestead was considered by a
federal district court in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding in In re
Bobbitt. 1 ° The bankrupts purchased a home in 1969 for over $120,000 at a
time when the lot, exclusive of any improvements, was valued at $20,000. At
the time of bankruptcy the lot had increased in value to $25,000. Applying
principles derived from Hoffman v. Love 01 and Valley Bank v. Skeen, 10 2 the
court concluded that the Bobbitts' exemption was limited to $5,000, the
amount of the exemption in effect when they purchased the property. 03
Consequently, the amount of the exemption was one-fourth of $25,000, or
$6,250, and the amount of the excess, three-fourths of $25,000, or $18,750.
The instant case, however, presented a question not raised in either
Hoffman or Skeen. The bankrupts had a purchase money mortgage indebtedness secured by a first lien deed of trust on the property in the amount of
$62,000. The court held that the amount of the first mortgage lien should first
be applied to the excess or nonexempt portion, $18,750, of the bankrupts'
homestead, leaving nothing for the bankrupts' general creditors. The impact
of this decision is substantial. Although a great many urban homesteads have
some excess or nonexempt portion due to an increase in real property values
in the last several years, it will be a rare case in which the monetary value of
the excess exceeds the purchase money mortgage indebtedness. The authority supporting the result reached is surprisingly not cited in the district judge's
opinion. The opinion of the bankruptcy judge, however, indicates that
primary reliance is placed upon Kerens National Bank v. Stockton." Although the question will not be settled until the Texas Supreme Court
considers the problem, it is unlikely that they will come to a different
conclusion.
98. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3825 (Vernon 1966).
99. See Underwood v. Russell, 4 Tex. 175 (1849) (excuse was that sheriff could find no
property upon which to levy the excution); Hackler v. Kohnstamm & Co., 227 S.W.2d 347 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1950, no writ) (excuse was that sheriff's investigation revealed no property
upon which to levy). See also TEX. Arr'v GEN. OP. No. H-827 (1976).
100. No. BK-3-74-373-F (N.D. Tex., Mar. 29, 1976).
101. 494 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Whiteman v.
Burkey, 286 S.W. 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1926, writ ref'd).
102. 401 F. Supp. 139 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
103. No. BK-3-74-373-F (N.D. Tex., March 29, 1976).
104. 120 Tex. 546, 40 S.W.2d 7 (1931). See also Lambhan v. Alliance Life Ins. Co., 134
S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1939, no writ); Burg v. Hitzfeld, 89 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1935, writ dism'd); Colwick v. Wright, 275 S.W. 152 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1925, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Chandler v. Young, 216 S.W. 484 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1919, no
writ); Pugh v. Whitsitt & Guerry, 161 S.W. 953 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1913, no writ).
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Several other homestead cases were decided during the survey period. In
O'Neil v. Mack Trucks, Inc. 105the constitutional prohibition against placing
voluntary encumbrances' °6 upon one's homestead was considered. In 1970
O'Neil gave a deed of trust covering 4.09 acres of land to secure a promissory
note. O'Neil contended that the land constituted his business homestead
because he was a truck distributor who had operated a distributorship on the
property as his business since 1965.107 The court of civil appeals agreed that
the deed of trust was invalid with respect to the business homestead.0 8
Of course, in subsequent cases which involve a business homestead
valuation, principles derived from Hoffman and Skeen will be applicable in
determining whether the debtor has an excess or nonexempt portion available
for creditors. The valuation of the urban homestead exemption should
proceed by considering both the residential and urban homesteads as one
unit. 109 In the case presently under consideration, however, the creditor did
not allege and prove that any excess existed. He did not, therefore, satisfy his
burden of proof with respect to the nonexempt portion of the debtor's
homestead. Lastly, the court restated the rule that the designation of a tract
with the assessor-collector for purposes of securing a tax exemption does not
determine the character of the property as a homestead' 0 one way or the
other.
IV.

SWORN ACCOUNTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES

The subject of sworn accounts, governed by rule 185,"' continued to
plague practitioners during the survey period. In Cal-Tex Beef Processors v.
2 the defendant's answer stated that "[tihe claim
Frozen FoodExpress, Inc. 11
alleged in Plaintiff's petition which is the foundation of Plaintiff's action is
wholly not just or true." I3 The court of civil appeals properly concluded that
the defendant's sworn answer neutralized the plaintiff's affidavit and destroyed its character as prima facie evidence, thereby placing the burden on
the plaintiff to prove his case as at common law. In addition, the appellate
105.

533 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ).

106. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50:

The homestead of a family, or a single adult person, shall be, and is hereby
protected from forced sale, for the payment of all debts except for the purchase
money thereof, or a part of such purchase money, the taxes due thereon, or for
work and material used in constructing improvements thereon ....
No mortgage, trust deed, or other lien on the homestead shall ever be valid,
except for the purchase money therefor, or improvements made thereon, as
hereinbefore provided, whether such mortgage, or trust deed, or other lien, shall
have been created by the owner alone, or together with his or her spouse, in case
the owner is married. All pretended sales of the homestead involving any
condition of defeasance shall be void.

107. 533 S.W.2d at 837.
108. See Mays v. Mays, 43 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1931, writ ref'd); Purdy
v. Grove, 35 S.W.2d 1078 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931, writ ref'd), for a definition of the
business homestead as being part of the urban homestead which need not be on a lot contiguous to
the residence of the homestead claimant, as long as the head of the family has a calling or business
to which the property is adapted and is reasonably necessary for the operation of the business.

109. See McSwain, The Texas Business Homestead, 15

BAYLOR

L.

REV.

39 (1963).

110. 533 S.W.2d at 837. The court appears to restrict its analysis here to a business
homestead. The designation can, however, be by use in any event.
11l. TEX. R. Civ. P. 185.
112. 530 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ). See also New Trends, Inc. v.
Stafford-Lowdon Co., 537 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
113. 530 S.W.2d at 144 (emphasis supplied by the court).
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court stated that a sworn denial is not necessary when the defendant is a
stranger to the transactions upon which the sworn account is based."'4
In dealing with the subject of attorneys' fees, the court overruled the
contention of the defendant that there was no evidence to support the trial
court's finding of fact with respect to reasonable attorneys' fees because the
trial court took judicial notice of the State Bar Minimum Fee Schedule as
permitted by article 2226.11
In Boysen v. Security Lumber Co.16 the defendant's unsworn answer was
accompanied by a sworn affidavit which stated that the "cause of action,
account and claim against him and in favor of Security Lumber Company,
Inc., is not a just and due amount and that all just and lawful offsets,
payments and credits have not been allowed."l 7 The court of civil appeals
properly held that the verified pleading was insufficient to deny the account
because the defendant did not specify in his answer the precise objection he
had to the plaintiff's allegations."18
The court also held that the stranger-to-the-account exception to the
requirement of an appropriate written denial under oath has only been applied
where the plaintiff's own pleadings, or the invoices or other evidence
exhibited as the basis of the obligation, reflected that the defendant was not a
party to the original transaction. Since the invoices were addressed to "Fred
Boysen, Bissonet Roofing Co.," the court held that the stranger-to-theaccount exception did not apply. Similarly, in apparent disagreement with
Cal-Tex the court held that the defendant's defense that he was merely an
officer of the corporation that owed the debt could not be proved in the
absence of a proper sworn denial under rule 185.119
The stranger-to-the-account exception was also considered in Booher v.
Criswell. 12 In a well reasoned opinion the court stated that the strict requirements of denial in accordance with rule 185 do not apply to a defendant who is
not liable in the capacity in which he was sued, and who is thus a stranger to
the transaction. In such a case a written denial under oath is, however, still
required by rule 93(c) "unless the truth of such matters appear of record." 121
The logic of the opinion serves to reconcile Cal-Tex and Boysen. The sworn
114. See Gorrell v. Tide Prods., Inc., 532 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no
writ); Hilton v. Musebeck Shoe Co., 505 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). But see Collins v. Kent-Coffey Mortgage Co., 380 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1964, writ ref'd).
115.

TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77) provides:

The amount prescribed in the current State Bar Minimum Fee Schedule shall be
prima facie evidence of reasonable attorney's fees. The court, in non-jury cases,
may take judicial knowledge of such schedule and the contents of the case file in
determining the amount of attorney's fees without the necessity of hearing
further evidence.
See Coward v. Gateway Nat'l Bank, 525 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1975); Edinburg Meat Prods. Co. v.
Vernon Co., 535 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976,.no writ); O'Brien v. Cole,
532 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ); Stafford v. Brennan, 498 S.W.2d 703
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, no writ).
116. 531 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ).
117.

Id. at 455.

118. See, e.g., Duncan v. Butterowe, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1971, no writ).
119.

See cases cited at note 114 supra.

120. 531 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).
121. TEX. R. Civ. P. 93(c).
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denial is required by rule 93(c) unless the plaintiff's pleadings indicate that the
defendant is a stranger to the transaction upon which the account is based. If
the defendant has properly pleaded that he is not liable in the capacity in
which he is sued under oath, he need not deny under oath the justness or truth
of the account in accordance with rule 185 to controvert the account and to
put the plaintiff on proof of his claim.
The requirements of the defendant's answer were also considered in Jeffrey
v. Larry Plotnick Co.' 22 The defendant filed a sworn denial alleging that "[t]he
account sued on is not just or true in whole or in part.' ' 23 The court again
properly held that this answer did not satisfy rules 185 and 93(k) 24 because it
did not state that each and every item was not just or true, or specify the items
that were not just and true. The defendant also pleaded the affirmative
defense of accord and satisfaction. Although this affirmative defense need
not be pleaded under oath, since the defendant failed to tender summary
judgment evidence in support of it, summary judgment was properly granted
25
to the plaintiff.
In Edinburg Meat Products Co. v. Vernon Co. 126 the defendant's sworn
denial was considered insufficient because it stated that "each and every item
in Plaintiff's Petition which is the foundation of Plaintiff's action. . . is not
just and true.', 27 Elevating form over substance, the court of civil appeals
held that the denial was insufficient because the rules require that a denial of
the whole claim state that each and every item is not just or true. The court
further held that the affidavit attached to the denial did not affirmatively show
that the affiant had any personal knowledge of the facts set out in the body of
the denial and was insufficient for this reason. The latter holding is also
questionable in the absence of a special exception by the plaintiff.'28
Similarly, in P. T. Poultry Growers, Inc. v. Darr Equipment Co. 129 the
defendant's verified answer consisted of a general denial and a special denial
in which defendant alleged that the account was "not reasonable or just, in
whole or in part."' 30 An affidavit attached to the answer stated: "[T]he
account which Plaintiff seeks to recover is neither just nor fair.' ' 3' The
defendant also set up an affirmative defense in the nature of a breach of an
implied warranty. However, by failing to introduce summary judgment
evidence in support of the affirmative defense, the defendant failed to take
32
the necessary action to avoid summary judgment.
The suit on a sworn account was also considered in the context of a default
judgment. In O'Brien v. Cole33 the defendant appealed from a default
judgment complaining inter alia, that the trial court erred in rendering
122. 532 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).
123. Id. at 101.
124. TEX. R. Civ. P. 185, 93(k).
125. See, e.g., Torres v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 457 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. 1970).
126. 535 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ).
127. Id. at 434 (emphasis added).
128. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1962).
129. 537 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
130. Id.at 774.
131. Id.
132. See Hidalgo v. Surety Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 462 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. 1971); Torres v.
Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 457 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. 1970).
133. 532 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
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judgment without hearing evidence and making a record. The court held that a
proper sworn account petition is prima facie evidence of the amount due and
that no further evidence was required. Hence no record was necessary. 34 On
the other hand, in General Leasing Co. v. Saxon Business Products, Inc. 135
the Eastland court of civil appeals held that a defective petition which failed
to specify the items of goods sold and delivered would also support a default
judgment because the judgment reflected that the trial court considered other
evidence. 136 Since, however, no statement of facts was made, the result seems
to be squarely at odds with MorganExpress, Inc. v. Elizabeth-Perkins,Inc. 137
38
The damages are not "liquidated and proved by an instrument in writing."
Consequently, the trial judge should have heard evidence of the goods
allegedly sold and delivered,' 39 since such evidence was not supplied by a
proper petition under rule 185.
V.

A.

USURY

Guaranty/SuretyshipObligations

An assertion that a loan transaction was usurious was made by a guarantor
of payment of a corporate obligation in Loomis Land & Cattle Co. v.
Diversified Mortgage Investors."4 The court of civil appeals held that the
guarantor was prohibited from asserting a defense of usury in connection with
his guaranty of an instrument' 4' evidencing a corporate obligation because the
interest rate contracted for did not exceed the statutory limit of one-and-onehalf percent for loans to corporations and article 1302-2.09142 precludes a
134. The defendant relied upon Morgan Express, Inc., v. Elizabeth-Perkins, Inc., 525 S.W.2d
312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd), which the court considered inapplicable to proper
suits on sworn account. MorganExpress was premised, in part, upon the duty of a court reporter
to attend all sessions of court and to take full testimony under TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2324
(Vernon 1971). It should be noted that the statute was amended in 1975 to provide that the
reporter shall attend all sessions "upon request." TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2324 (Vernon
Supp. 1976-77). See, e.g., Bledsoe v. Black, 535 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no
writ). See, however, Smith v. Smith, 544 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 1976), which appears to back off from
Morgan Express at least to the extent that the appellant is apparently required to request the trial
judge to prepare a narrative statement of facts. The supreme court does not mention either
Morgan Express or the amendment to the statute.
135. 533 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ).
136. Id. at 871. "[li]t would be presumed in the absence of a statement of facts, that the trial
judge had before him sufficient evidence to support the judgment since the judgment itself did not
affirmatively disclose that it was based on the exhibit alone or that no other evidence was heard."
Id.; see note 134 supra.
137. See note 134 supra.
138. TEX. R. Civ. P. 241.
139. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 243; Southern S.S. Co. v. Schumacher Co., 154 S.W.2d 283, 284 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Galveston 1941, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
140. 533 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
141. Id.at 426.
142. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77):
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, corporations, domestic or foreign,
may agree to and stipulate for any rate of interest as such corporation may
determine, not to exceed one and one-half percent (1/2%) per month, on any
bond, note, debt, contract or other obligation of such corporation under which the
original principal amount is Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) or more, or on any
series of advances of money pursuant thereto if the aggregate of sums advanced
or originally proposed to be advanced shall exceed Five Thousand Dollars
($5,000), or on any extension or renewal thereof, and in such instances, the claim
or defense of usury by such corporation, its successors, guarantors, assigns or
anyone on its behalf is prohibited; however, nothing contained herein shall
prevent any charitable or religious corporation from asserting the claim or
interposing the defense of usury in any action or proceeding.
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guarantor of a corporate debt from raising a defense of usury if the corporation cannot do so. Moreover, the fact that the lender refused to make the loan

unless the claimant agreed to act as guarantor of payment did not render the
loan transaction usurious. 143 Therefore, although it has been held that when
an individual and a corporation execute a "joint and several" note as
co-makers the individual has a cause of action for usury, 144 a guarantor of a
corporate obligation has no such cause of 14action
or defense unless the
5
statutory corporate rate has been exceeded.
A similar fact pattern emerged in Pinemont Bank v. DuCroz .146 The trial

court had granted summary judgment in behalf of the plaintiffs in the
following context. A note in the amount of $180,000 bearing interest at
thirteen-and-one-fourth percent per annum was signed by two corporate

entities and five individuals. The interest rate exceeded the ten percent
maximum set by statute for individuals 147 but did not exceed the maximum
corporate rate. 48 The individuals argued that they were co-makers entitled to
assert usury as both a defense and an affirmative claim for relief. An award of
twice the usurious interest contracted for 149 was given to each of the three

plaintiffs. 150 The court of civil appeals held that the maximum "forfeiture"
which could be awarded pursuant to article 5069-1.06(a) was twice the total
interest contracted for, regardless of how many makers are individually liable

on the note.'5 1
Another argument of defendant bank on appeal was that individual plain-

tiffs signed the instrument as "guarantors" of the corporate loan which the
defendant had offered to prove at trial by the introduction of oral testimony.
Citing section 3.415(c)"' for the proposition that such proof would be
permissible, the appellate court reversed the trial court's grant of summary

judgment and remanded the case for new trial.
143. See Skeen v. Glenn Justice Mortgage Co., 526 S.W.2d 252, 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1975, no writ).
144. Sud v. Morris, 492 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, no writ).
145. See Micrea v. Eureka Life Ins. Co., 534 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976,
no writ), for the same result based upon convoluted reasoning.
146. 528 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ).
147. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.02 (Vernon 1971).
148. See id. art 1302-2.09 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77), quoted at note 142 supra.
149. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon 1971) provides:
Any person who contracts for, charges or receives interest which is greater than
the amount authorized by this Subtitle, shall forfeit to the obligor twice the
amount of interest contracted for, charged or received, and reasonable attorneys'
fees fixed by the court provided that there shall be no penalty for a violation
which results from an accidental and bona fide error.
See also Johns v. Jaeb, 518 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ), discussed in
Henderson, Commercial Transactions, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 118, 137-38
(1976).
150. The note was paid before judgment was entered. Therefore, no question of setting off the
amount of the unpaid principal of the note arose. See, e.g., Johns v. Jaeb, 518 S.W.2d 857 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
151. The award apparently will be made "collectively." Compulsory joinder problems will
necessarily arise in connection with usury claims as a result of the "one cause of action" position
espoused by the court. See Dorsaneo, Compulsory Joinderof Parties in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REV.
345 (1977).
152. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.415(c) (Vernon 1968). "As against a holder in due
course and without notice of the accommodation oral proof of the accommodation is not
admissible to give the accommodation party the benefit of discharges dependent on his character
as such. In other cases the accommodation character may be shown by oral proof." Id.
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Section 3.415 deals with accommodation parties. An accommodation party
is one who signs the instrument in any capacity for the purpose of lending his
name to another party to it. 5 He is a surety liable on the instrument who has a
right of recourse on the instrument against the party accommodated if the
surety pays the instrument, 54 as well as the benefit of certain suretyship
55
defenses. 1
In the context of the Texas Business and Commerce Code a guarantor is
also a surety'56 entitled to the suretyship defenses. Whether one is a guarantor
on an instrument depends upon whether words of guarantee are added to the
signature of a party to an instrument on which at least one other party is
primarily liable. For example, a guarantor on an instrument who places the
words "payment guaranteed" or their equivalent on the instrument agrees
that if the instrument is not paid when due, he will pay it according to its tenor
without resort by the holder to any other party including the party who
actually was accommodated by the guarantor. 57 If, however, the words
"collection guaranteed" or their equivalent are used, conditions precedent to
the guarantor's liability must be satisfied. 58 Lastly, "[w]ords of guaranty
59
which do not otherwise specify guarantee payment."'
In the case under consideration no words of guarantee appeared on the
instrument. Therefore, strictly speaking, the five individuals who signed the
note were not guarantors within the meaning of section 3.416.'6° Undoubtedly, oral proof could be utilized by the holder-payee to show that they signed as
accommodation makers. The Uniform Commercial Code, however, does not
contemplate that oral proof of the status of a signer of an instrument as a
guarantor will be necessary, presumably because as far as liability on the
instrument is concerned, the position of the guarantor and the accommodation maker are the same so long as the instrument does not reflect the words,
"collection guaranteed" or their equivalent. Both are sureties who engage to
pay the instrument according to its tenor without resort by the holder to any
other party.
Quite obviously, the bank in the instant case wished to show that the five
individuals signed as an accommodation to the corporate signers in order to
take advantage of article 1302-2.09,161 which precludes a business corporation, its successors, guarantors, assigns, or anyone in its behalf from asserting
a claim or defense of usury unless the corporate rate is exceeded. The
statutory section does not, however, explicitly state that accommodation
makers cannot do so. Despite problems of nomenclature, it should make no
difference whether the sureties of a corporate obligation are labeled as
guarantors of payment, guarantors of collection, or accommodation makers
153. Id. § 3.415(a); see Jones v. San Angelo Nat'l Bank, 518 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in Henderson, supra note 149, at 129.
154. See TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.415(e) (Vernon 1968).
155. See id. § 3.606.
156. See id. § 1.201(40). "Surety includes guarantor." Id.
157. Id. § 3.416(a).
158. Id. § 3.416(b).
159.
160.
161.

supra.

Id. § 3.416(c).
Id. § 3.416(d).
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77), quoted at note 142
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in the context of a defense or claim of usury. 162 Guarantors of payment and
accommodation makers stand on the same footing with respect to primary
liability on an instrument. Consequently, their positions should be the same in
the context of a claim or defense of usury. Guarantors of collection have
additional protection by virtue of the fact that they are required to fulfill their
guarantee only after the holder has reduced his claim against the maker or
acceptor to judgment and execution has been returned unsatisfied, or after
the maker or acceptor has become insolvent or it is otherwise apparent that it
is useless to proceed against him. 163 However, these conditions precedent to
the liability of a guarantor of collection do not provide a basis for treating
guarantors of collection differently from guarantors of payment in the usury
context.
UniversalMetals & Machinery, Inc. v. Bohart'14 presented an opportunity
for the supreme court to construe Texas usury law in the context of suretyship
obligations. Universal instituted suit against the Boharts to recover approximately $220,000, which was the unpaid principal of a promissory note. The
note was purportedly signed by Beneficiadora de Minerales de Tlaxcola, SA
(BMT), by Manuel Cortes, "Presidente of the Corporation."1 65 It provided
for interest at the rate of "(12%) per annum on the unpaid balance hereof from
time to time outstanding."' 166 On the same instrument the Boharts agreed:
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned
as primary obligor(s), hereby (jointly and severally unconditionally guarantee(s)
the prompt payment of principal and interest on the foregoing promissory note when and as due in accordance with its terms, and hereby
waive(s) diligence, presentment, demand, protest or notice of any kind
whatsoever, as well as any requirement that the holder exhaust any right
or take any action against the maker of the foregoing promissory note and
hereby consent(s) to any extension of time or renewal thereof.
/s/ James T. Bohart
/s/ Jean Bohart (Mrs. James T. Bohart)
(Name of Guarantor)

7
(Name of Guarantor) 16

BMT was not sued since Universal sought judgment against the Boharts as
primary obligors.'6 The trial court rendered judgment for Universal as the
holder-payee of the note and denied the Boharts' counterclaim that Universal
charged usurious interest.169 The court of civil appeals 70 reversed the judg162. See, e.g.,
Raby v. Commercial Banking Corp., 208 Pa. Super. Ct. 52,220 A.2d 659(1966).
163. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.416(b) (Vernon 1968).
164. 539 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. 1976).
165. Id.at 876.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Compare TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 1986, 1987 (Vernon 1964), and TEX. Bus. &
COMM. CODE ANN. § 34.02 (Vernon 1968), with id. §§ 3.416(a), .416(b). Compare also Cook v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank, 538 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ), with Bohart.
Cook concludes that a guarantor who unconditionally guarantees payment on a debt and becomes
absolutely liable cannot be sued without the joinder of the original debtor if the guarantor raises
his absence at trial. Reliance is placed on art. 1987 as construed in Wood v. Canfield Paper Co.,
117 Tex. 399, 5 S.W.2d 748 (1928). See also TEX. R. Civ. P. 31. Cook does not mention either TEX.
Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.416(a) (Vernon 1968), or the Bohart opinion and appears in conflict
with both of them. See also Yandell v. Tarrant State Bank, 538 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e), for an attempted reconciliation of Bohart and Cook.
169. 523 S.W.2d 279, 283 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975).
170. Id.
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ment of the trial court and rendered judgment that Universal take nothing on
the theory that the instrument reflected that the Boharts were primary
obligors and also guarantors, that the two terms are mutually exclusive, that
the instrument should be construed in favor of its being a guaranty which
imposed only secondary liability, and, since BMT could not be liable, 171 the
Boharts were not liable either.
In its first opinion 72 the supreme court reversed judgments of both the trial
court and the court of civil appeals and remanded the cause to the trial court
for another trial. Citing section 3.416(a) of the Texas Business and Commerce
Code,' 73 the supreme court concluded that the Boharts had unconditionally
guaranteed payment and waived any requirement that the holder of the note
exhaust its rights or take action against the maker as a condition precedent to
their liability. Thus, the Boharts were held to be "guarantors who are
primarily liable, who are jointly, severally and unconditionally liable for the
prompt payment of principal and interest, when due and whether any action is
taken against the maker or not' ' 174 and whether or not the maker has any
enforceableobligation.175 Having found the Boharts liable on the instrument,
the supreme court next considered their counterclaim for double the amount
of interest charged pursuant to article 5069-1.06.176
Universal contended that article 1302-2.09177 prohibited the usury claim by
its express items. The supreme court held that the Boharts were co-obligors
rather than mere guarantors and that as individuals who were liable as makers
the Boharts correctly invoked the claim and defense
of usury.178 In a judicial
179
withdrawn.
was
opinion
court's
the
volte-face
On rehearing the supreme court concluded that the term "guarantors" in
article 1302-2.09180 included "guarantors of all kinds" and affirmed the trial
court judgment that Universal recover from the Boharts on the note. Henceforward, guarantors of payment of corporate loans evidenced by notes may
not assert a claim or defense of usury despite their primary liability unless the
corporate interest rate is exceeded.
From a review of the foregoing cases it appears that the question of the
availability of claims and defenses of usury has been for the most part
resolved during the survey period. Such claims are not available to guarantors
of payment or guarantors of collection of corporate obligations evidenced by
instruments when the corporate rate has not been exceeded. Similarly,
accommodation parties are dealt with on the same basis as guarantors. A
problem is presented, however, by case authority which holds that certain
makers are not accommodation parties because they exercise control over the
171. The jury found that BMT's signature was forged. Id. at 284-85.
172. 19 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 212 (March 13, 1976).
173. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.416(a) (Vernon 1968). " 'Payment guaranteed' or
equivalent words added to a signature mean that the signer engages that if the instrument is not
paid when due he will pay it according to its tenor without resort by the holder to any other
party." Id.
174. 19 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.at 212-13; see note 168 supra.
175. See Winship, Commercial Transactions, p. supra.
176. See note 149 supra.
177. See note 142 supra.
178. 19 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.at 215.
179. 539 S.W.2d 874, 879 (Tex. 1976).
180. See note 142 supra.
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corporate borrower ostensibly accommodated. 8' In order to avail themselves
of the defense or claim of usury, persons liable on instruments will now argue
that they are co-makers within the meaning of Sud v. Morris.'8 2 On the other
hand, lenders confronted with potential usury claims will contend that the
individual claimants are guarantors or accommodation parties who may not
assert a claim or defense of usury unless the corporate entity accommodated
could assert it.
The Bohart decision was followed in Hartnett v. Adams & Holmes
Mortgage Co. 183 It is now clear that guarantors of payment can be sued
without the joinder of the party accommodated because they are independently liable. Moreover, they may not assert a claim or defense of usury in
situations where the party accommodated cannot do so.
B. Compensating Balances
In Hurley v. NationalBank of Commerce "sa borrower instituted an action
against the bank to recover twice the amount of the interest paid on a loan in
the amount of $454,669.32, represented by a note dated July 14, 1967.
Although the note provided for interest at the rate of seven-and-one-half
percent per annum, the borrower contended that as a part of the original
transactions he was required by the lender to maintain bank balances totalling
$100,000 at the bank. Consequently, he argued that the principal amount of
the loan was reduced by $100,000 and that the interest rate actually exceeded
ten percent.' 85 Unfortunately for the borrower, the court held that the claim
for usury was limited to the interest paid8 6 to the bank before April 14, 1969,
when the bank ceased to receive interest payments as a result of an assignment of the note and that the usury claim was barred by the two-year statute
of limitations. Hence the compensating balances requirement was not considered. In order to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations the borrower argued
that the rule of locus poenatentiae,8 7 which permits the lender to treat the
loan at maturity as one for the principal amount actually advanced, provided
he collects no more than lawful interest, applied and, therefore, that no cause
of action for usury accrued until the aggregate of the payments made
exceeded the principal advanced. The court held that under the federal statute
the limitation period on a claim for usury penalties begins to run on each
payment from the time it is made." 8
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
allowed

See notes 156-62 supra and accompanying text.
492 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, no writ).
539 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
529 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).
See 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1970), which allows a national bank to charge interest "at the rate
by the laws of the State . . .where the bank is located."

186. See id. § 86:

The taking, receiving, reserving, or charging a rate of interest greater than is
allowed by the preceding section, when knowingly done, shall be deemed a
forfeiture of the entire interest which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt
carries with it, or which has been agreed to be paid thereon. In case the greater
rate of interest has been paid, the person by whom it has been paid, or his legal

representatives, may recover back, in an action in the nature of an action of debt,

twice the amount of the interest thus paid from the association taking or receiving
same: Provided, That such action is commenced within two years from the time
the usurious transaction occurred.
187. See Smith v. First Nat'l Bank, 42 Neb. 687, 60 N.W. 866, 867 (1894).
188. See McCarthy v. First Nat'l Bank, 223 U.S. 493, 499 (1912).
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In Commerce Savings Association v. GGE Management Co. 819 Gertner,
individually and as president of GGE Management Company (GGE), executed a promissory note to Angleton Savings Association" 9 (the Association)
dated April 17, 1970, in the principal amount of $600,000, bearing interest at
the rate of twelve percent per annum over a ten-year period in consecutive
monthly installments of $6,607. The loan was guaranteed by Merrell and
Westmoreland. 191
The consideration for the execution of the note and guarantee agreement
was the purchase price ($400,000) of certain real property conveyed by the
Association to GGE and funds to be advanced by the Association to GGE for
construction on the real property.
Several factors complicated the determination of the amount of interest
involved in the loan transaction:
(1) The Association purchased the real property from Merrell for
$349,000 as part of the same financing transaction. This resulted in an
immediate front-end profit to the Association of $51,000.
(2) The Association required GGE to maintain a compensating balance of
$600,000 in the form of brokered certificates of deposit. GGE was compelled
to pay a fee of $21,000 to independent brokers.
(3) The Association also required $200,000 of brokered certificates to be
placed on deposit at another lending institution (Angleton Bank of Commerce). GGE was compelled to pay a fee of $5,912.50 for them to independent
brokers.
(4) On August 25, 1972, Gertner and GGE entered into a "Modification
and Extension Agreement" which provided for a reduction of principal on the
note from $600,000 to $539,226.28, a reduction of the interest rate from twelve
to eight-and-one-half percent, and an extension of maturity from August 17,
1980, to September 17, 1996.
(5) Gertner's personal liability on the note was restricted to such loss as
might be realized by the Association with respect to stated percentages of the
unpaid principal balance at the time of foreclosure "in case of default or
foreclosure" on the deed of trust and security agreement executed contemporaneously with the $600,000 promissory note.
On February 22, 1974, the Association brought suit on the note as modified,
seeking recovery of the sum of $528,878.98 with interest thereon from
December 17, 1973, against Gertner, GGE, Westmoreland, and Merrell,
jointly and severally.
Gertner, GGE, and Westmoreland filed verified answers asserting that the
loan transaction was usurious. Merrell answered that he had been released
from liability by reason of the limitation on Gertner's liability and the
189. 539 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ).
190. In December 1973 Angleton changed its name to Commerce. Id. at 74.
191. The guarantee agreement guaranteed:
[T]he full and prompt payment to the Association at maturity, and at all time
thereafter, and also at the time hereinafter provided, of the indebtedness,
liabilities and obligations of said Debtor to the Association to the extent of:
SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND AND NO/100 ($600,000.00) DOLLARS as is or
the remaining balance on one certain note and deed of trust ....
Id. at 78.

236

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

modification agreement and asserted a right of indemnification against
Westmoreland.
Subsequently, on August 21, 1974, Gertner and GGE filed a counterclaim
against the Association, asserting that the note was usurious on its face
because it required Gertner, an individual, to pay interest at the rate of twelve
percent per annum, that the $51,000 profit realized by Commerce was
interest, that the $21,000 brokerage fee was interest, and that the $5,912.50
brokerage fee benefited the officers and shareholders of the Association in an
effort to acquire the Association. They thus sought to recover penalty interest
together with exemplary damages and attorneys' fees.
After a jury trial judgment was rendered that the Association take nothing
on its suit to recover on a promissory note and for foreclosure of liens and
security interest, that Gertner and GGE recover $569,010.26 in penalty
interest, and that GGE recover all principal payments on the note ($71,121.02)
plus $5,912.50 as actual damages for conversion of the cost of the certificates
of deposit on deposit with the Angleton Bank of Commerce.
The court of civil appeals held that as to Gertner the loan transaction was
not usurious because his liability was limited to the payment of certain
amounts of unpaid principal. In addition, the jury finding that the $51,000 real
estate profits constituted interest was found to be supported by the evidence,
but it was held that the $51,000 loan charge should be allocated over the period
beginning April 20, 1970, the date of the initial cash advance, and ending
August 30, 1972, the last day before the charge was "restored" by a credit
against principal made on August 31, 1972, pursuant to the provisions of the
modification and extension agreement. The total charges received by the
Association during such period were thus rendered within the corporate rate
permitted by article 1302-2.09,192 despite the fact that certain payments on the
93
note exceeded the statutory limit of one-and-one-half percent per month.1
The court also held that since the brokerage fees were not paid to the
Association, they did not constitute interest. Consequently, the court of civil
appeals, concluding that the loan transaction was not usurious as to GGE,
held that the Association recover judgment against GGE, Merrell, and
Westmoreland for $528,878.98 representing unpaid principal, 194 against GGE
for interest at the rate of ten percent, 195 for interest against the guarantors at
the rate of six percent from the date of their default,'9 and against Gertner for
$120,000, the applicable limit of his liability under the limitation of liability
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
539 S.W.2d at 82:
In our opinion, it would be manifestly unfair and beyond the obvious intent of the
legislature in the enactment of the usury statute, to impose the severe penalties
afforded by Article 5069-1.06, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., solely upon proof that
one monthly payment exceeded the statutory limit, where over the effective
period of the loan, payments did not, in the aggregate, exceed the amount
authorized by law. Such an arbitrary basis of computation would, in our opinion,
permit a borrower, unilaterally, to establish a usurious charge, where no such
charge had been exacted or required by the lender.
194. The court had held previously that the guarantor's guarantee restricted their obligation to
principal only. See note 191 supra.
195. This is curious in light of the modification agreement.
196. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1971).
192.
193.
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agreement. Merrell's argument that the modification agreement released his
obligation was rejected because he had given advance consent thereto under
the terms of the guaranty. 97
The treatment of the compensating balance in the instant case is troublesome. Although the fees were paid to independent brokers, the bank was
certainly benefited by a substantial increase in its deposits. It would be more
sensible to treat the broker's commission as interest because the bank
received the benefit of the expenditure.
In Moss v. Metropolitan National Bank 98 the court of civil appeals held
that a bank entitled to summary judgment on two promissory notes despite
the fact that the defendants filed a sworn answer setting up a counterclaim for
usury' 99 and an affidavit in opposition to the bank's motion for summary
judgment. The affidavit stated that the defendants were required to place a
compensating balance in the amount of $50,000 with the bank as a further
consideration and charge for the loans and that the borrowers had to pay three
other parties $1,250 to make the deposit. Citing Commerce Savings Association v. GGE Management Co. ,2o the court of civil appeals held that since the
three other parties who received the $1,250 to supply the compensating
balance were not agents of the bank, the lender did not receive the service
charge and it did not constitute interest. Hence no summary judgment
evidence was presented that the loan transaction was usurious. 20 The court of
civil appeals also held that the holder of a note is prima facie entitled to
recover the amount of attorney's fees stipulated in a note when the note is in
2°2
default.
C.

Commitment Fees

The question of whether a commitment fee constitutes interest was considered in Gonzales County Savings & Loan v. Freeman.2 3 The supreme court
clearly indicated that a fee which commits a lender to make a loan at some
future date is not interest. 2°4 The fee purchases an option which permits the
borrower to obtain a loan in the future. 2 5 However, only a bona fide
197. 539 S.W.2d at 82-83. The guarantee agreement provided:
Authority and consent are hereby expressly given said Association from time to
time, and without any notice to the undersigned, to give and make such extensions, renewals, indulgences, settlements and compromises as it may deem
proper with respect to any of the indebtedness, liabilities and obligations covered
by this guaranty, including the taking or releasing of security and surrendering of
documents.
198. 533 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ).
199. TEX. R. Civ. P. 93.
200. 539 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ).
201. In dictum the court stated that since the note was not usurious on its face, the borrower
had to "establish that there was a corrupt agreement or scheme to cover usury and that such
agreement or scheme was in the contemplation of the parties." Id. at 81; see Richards v. Moody,
422 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
202. The note provided for attorneys' fees of "not less than ten percent." Id. at 78. See also
Kuper v. Schmidt, 161 Tex. 189, 338 S.W.2d 948 (1960).
203. 534 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1976).
204. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(a) (Vernon 1971): " 'Interest' is the
compensation allowed by law for the use or forbearance or detention of money; provided
however, this term shall not include any time price differential however denominated arising out

of a credit sale."
205. See Greever v. Persky, 140 Tex. 64, 165 S.W.2d 709 (1942).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

commitment fee is not interest. As the supreme court stated, "whether or not
a charge labeled a 'commitment fee' is merely a cloak to conceal usury may
depend upon whether or not the fee is unreasonable in light of the risk to be
borne by the lender." 2°6 The commitment fee must be intended only as
compensation for having the future loan available, and for no other
purpose .207
The supreme court also considered the argument of the Savings and Loan
Association that section 5.07 of the Texas Savings and Loan Act 2" 8 permittedthe lender to charge borrowers an open-ended initial charge for the right to
receive a loan. Although the supreme court's opinion is far from clear on this
point, the court seems to be saying that only "reasonable" premiums can be
charged a borrower for the making of loans. On the other hand, the opinion
may be read to mean that insofar as premiums are concerned, section 5.07 is
unconstitutional. 209 The former reading is more likely, however, because the
opinion reflects the supreme court's concern that a Savings and Loan
Association should not be allowed a convenient avenue of escape from the
usury laws by simply labeling a front end charge as a premium and, therefore,
not interest.
Unfortunately, a third hybrid interpretation is plausible. The supreme court
could be saying that section 5.07 would be constitutional if the word "reasonable" were inserted in the statute, but that as it is now written even
"reasonable" premiums are interest. 2 ° Of course, even if "reasonable"
206. 534 S.W.2d at 906.
207. Id. The court's language is probably an overstatement of its position. What seems to be
intended is that a "commitment fee" label cannot be utilized to insulate a transaction from being
usurious.
208. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 852a, § 5.07 (Vernon 1974):
Every associaiion may require borrowing members to pay all reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the making, closing, disbursing, extending,
readjusting or renewing of real estate loans, which such charges may be collected
by the association from the borrower and retained by it or paid to any persons,
including any director, officer, or employee of the association rendering services
in connection therewith, or paid directly by the borrower. In addition, associations may charge premiums for making such loans as well as penalties for
prepayments or late payments; provided, that unless agreed in writing to the
contrary, any prepayment of principal shall be applied on the final installment of
the note or other obligation until fully paid, and thereafter on the installments in
the inverse order of their maturity. The expenses, fees and charges authorized
herein shall be in addition to interest authorized by law, and shall not be deemed
to be a part of the interest collected or agreed to be paid on such loans wi.hin the
meaning of any law of this State which limits the rate of interest which may be
exacted in any transaction. No director, officer or employee of an association
shall receive any fee or other compensation of any kind in connection with
procuring any loan for an association, except for services actually rendered as
above provided. A loan settlement statement shall be furnished by or on behalf of
the association to each borrower upon the closing of every real estate loan,
indicating in detail the expenses, fees and charges such borrower has paid or
obligated himself to pay to the association or to any other person in connection
with such loan. A copy of such statement shall be retained in the records of the
association.
209. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11: "The Legislature shall have authority to ... define
interest and fix maximum rates of interest."
210. "In the absence of language setting a maximum rate for such charges or an appropriate
modification of the definition of 'interest' [apparently meaning a workable definition of what is
not interest], such 'premium' charges will be deemed to constitute interest when seeking to
determine the existence or non-existence of usury." 534 S.W.2d at 908.
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premiums are not interest, further elucidation of the factors to be considered
in determining the issue of reasonableness must be awaited.
VI.

RECEIVERSHIP

The harsh remedy of receivership also received judicial attention during the
survey period. ContinentalHomes Co. v. Hilltown PropertyOwner- Association, Inc. 21 involved an appeal from an interlocutory ex parte order appointing a temporary receiver to take over the possession and control of the
business and the real and personal property belonging to the defendants. The
court of civil appeals vacated the trial court's order because the applicantplaintiff had failed to post a bond 212 and because an ex parte appointment of a
receiver is precluded when the appointment is to take charge of the defendant's "fixed and immovable" property 2 a unless a specific dispensation from
2 14
the notice and hearing requirement is provided by statute.
In Best Investment Co. v. Whirley 2 5 the court considered the impropriety
of the appointment of a receiver without notice and hearing in the absence of a
showing of extreme emergency and imperious necessity. A judgment creditor
secured the ex parte appointment of a receiver to take possession of real and
personal property allegedly being transferred by the judgment debtor to avoid
satisfaction of the judgment. The verified petition of the plaintiff did not
demonstrate that an extreme emergency existed or that no other remedy
would be adequate to protect the plaintiff. Hence the ex parte appointment of
a receiver was improper.
The petition also did not reflect that the plaintiff was a lien creditor with
respect to the personalty placed in receivership by the trial court's order.
Although article 2293216 does not expressly state that a creditor must have a
specific lien or security interest in the property or fund or proceeds sought to
be placed in receivership, an unbroken line of cases supplies the requirement. 217 Moreover, the interest of a general unsecured creditor who asserts
211.
212.

529 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ).
See TEX. R. Civ. P. 695a:
No receiver shall be appointed with authority to take charge of property until
the party applying therefor has filed with the clerk of the court a good and
sufficient bond, to be approved by such clerk, payable to the defendant in the
amount fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of all damages and cost in
such suit, in case it should be decided that such receiver was wrongfully
appointed to take charge of such property. The amount of such bond shall be
fixed at a sum sufficient to cover all such probable damages and costs. In a
divorce case the court or judge, as a matter of discretion, may dispense with the
necessity of a bond.
See also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2296 (Vernon 1971):
When a receiver is appointed, he shall, before he enters upon his duties, be sworn
to perform them faithfully, and shall execute a good and sufficient bond, to be
approved by the court appointing him, in the sum fixed by the court, conditioned
that he will faithfully discharge his duty as receiver in the action (naming it) and
obey the orders of the court therein.
213. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 695; Erwin v. Steele, 228 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1950,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
214. See, e.g., TEX. REV, Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-25-1 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
215. 536 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
216. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2293 (Vernon 1971).
217. See, e.g., Carter v. Hightower, 79 Tex. 135, 137, 15 S.W. 223, 224 (1887); Parr v. First
State Bank, 507 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ). But see TEX. Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.05 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
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that his debtor has fraudulently transferred property does not rise to the
dignity of a lien for the purpose of article 2293.218

Unfortunately, the court of civil appeals also stated in its opinion that a
motion to vacate the receivership made to the trial judge would have constituted a waiver of irregularities in the original appointment. Although it cited
several court of civil appeals opinions for the proposition, 2 19 the cases only
stand for the proposition that the appearance of a defendant after the
appointment of a receiver cures any error in the appointment as to notice. 220
Other irregularities, such as the failure of the creditor to be a secured or lien
creditor, should not be waived by a motion to vacate made to the trial judge.
In Hughes v. Marshall National Bank 22' the court of civil appeals also
considered the appointment of a receiver pursuant to article 2293(1) in the
context of the applicant's failure to allege or prove that it had no adequate
remedy at law. Since, however, the appointment of the receiver was made
after notice and hearing, the court of civil appeals correctly held that "when a
receiver is sought on the basis of Subdivision 1 of the statute, allegations and
proof of the inadequacy of a legal remedy is not necessary." 222
In FirstSouthernProperties,Inc. v. Vallone 223 the supreme court held that a
court-appointed receiver could set aside a foreclosure sale made to a bona
fide purchaser for value without actual notice of the receiver's appointment
of property which he has been appointed to "manage or sell." Since such
property is in custodia legis, the supreme court held that the sale was void
despite the fact that the receiver did not file a notice of lis pendens. 224
In Fuller v. Nee1225 the court of civil appeals characterized as dictum and
refused to follow the broad language used by the supreme court that all sales
of property held in custodia legis are void unless authorized by the court in
which the receivership proceeding is pending. Citing cases holding that an
owner of property in the hands of a receiver can be encumbered by the
owner, 26 the court of civil appeals held that a sale of property by the property
owner is not void, but merely subject to the receivership in the sense that
whatever interest the owner of the property would have left after the payment
of all claims allowed in the receivership proceeding could be transferred by
the owner during its pendency. This reading of Vallone is questionable.
218. See Waples-Platter Co. v. Mitchell, 35 S.W. 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, writ ref'd).
219. Ramsey v. Oliver, 246 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1952, no writ); Batchelor v.
Pacific Fin. Corp., 207 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1947, no writ); Lacey v. Dayton
Rubber Mfg. Co., 270 S.W. 916, 917 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1925, writ dism'd).
220. Even this sensible limitation is questionable in the light of Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972), and its progeny.
221. 538 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
222. Id. at 824. See also Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 136
S.W.2d 800 (1940); Richardson v. McCloskey, 228 S.W. 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1920, writ
dism'd).
223. 533 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1976). See also Moody v. State, 538 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
224. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 6640, 6642 (Vernon 1969), enacted in 1905 to modify
the harsh common law doctrine of lis pendens.
225. 535 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ).
226. See Lorraine v. Masterson, 193 S.W. 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1917, writ ref'd);
United States & Mexican Trust Co. v. Delaware W. Constr. Co., 112 S.W. 447 (Tex. Civ. App.
1908, no writ).

